Epistemological Views of Abdu'l-Baha

by Mikhail Sergeev, Ph.D.

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Epistemological Views of ‘Abdu’l-Bahái
“Whatever the intelligence of man cannot
understand religion ought not to accept.”
‘Abdu’l-Bahá
Introductory Remarks
It became traditional in modern philosophy to begin the exposition of any philosophical
system with a thinker’s take on epistemological issues. The son of the founder of Bahá’í Faith and
the leader of the new religious movement after the death of his father, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was not a
systematic philosopher and he did not write a treatise on the theory of knowledge. He touched upon
epistemological problems, however, in the context of various religious and philosophical topics he
had been discussing in many of his talks and books.

‘Abdu’l-Bahá dwelled on epistemological
themes in several chapters of Some Answered Questions (1904-06), as well as in the Tablets of
Divine Plan (1916-17) and the Tablet to Dr. Forel (1921). He also made important remarks with
regard to the theory of knowledge in a series of presentations on Bahá’í teachings delivered in
Europe and North America and recorded in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in London and Paris Talks (1911) as well
as in the Promulgation of Universal Peace (1912).
The aim of my paper is to present a comprehensive reconstruction of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
epistemological views that are scattered throughout many of his writings and utterances.
Types of Knowledge
Generally speaking, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá distinguishes two kinds of knowledge: “One is subjective
and the other objective knowledge – that is to say, an intuitive knowledge and a knowledge derived
from perception.”ii He writes,
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The knowledge of things which men universally have is gained by reflection or by evidence
– that is to say, either by the power of the mind the conception of an object is formed, or
from beholding an object the form is produced in the mirror of the heart… But the second
sort of knowledge, which is the knowledge of being… is like the cognizance and
consciousness that man has of himself.”iii
Reflecting on various aspects of inner or intuitive knowledge ‘Abdu’l-Bahá points out that human
insight comes to fruition in the course of meditation which
is the key for opening the doors of mysteries. In that state man abstracts himself: in that state
man withdraws himself from all outside objects; in that subjective mood he is immersed in
the ocean of spiritual life and can unfold the secrets of things-in-themselves.iv
“Through the faculty of meditation,” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá continues,
man… receives the breath of the Holy Spirit [and] Divine inspiration… This faculty brings
forth from the invisible plane the sciences and arts. Through the meditative faculty
inventions are made possible, colossal undertakings are carried out… governments can run
smoothly [and] man enters into the very Kingdom of God.v
The intuitive power of the human spirit can manifest itself in a wakeful state as well as in the
state of sleep by means of dreams and visions. “How often it happens,” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá points out,
that [man] sees a dream in the world of sleep, and its signification becomes apparent two
years afterward in corresponding events. In the same way, how many times it happens that a
question which one cannot solve in the world of wakefulness is solved in the world of
dreams.vi
He also argues that our intuitive abilities allow us to communicate with the departed souls. Such
“conversation can be held, but not as our [physical] conversation,” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá remarks. “The
heart of man is open to inspiration,” he adds, “this is spiritual communication. As in a dream one
talks with a friend while the mouth is silent, so it is in the conversation of the spirit.”vii
The ultimate achievement of human intuition is revelation that is available only to a limited
number of people called prophets. The prophets and, especially the founders of major religions
whom ‘Abdu’l-Bahá refers to as Divine Manifestations, share with other humans the sensory and
rational capacity for knowledge, but in addition they possess intuitive or heavenly comprehension
that “embraces all things, knows all mysteries, discovers all signs, and rules over all things.”viii As
‘Abdu’l-Bahá explains, the source of intuitive understanding is
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the spirit [that] surrounds the body and is aware of its sensations and powers. This
knowledge is not the outcome of effort and study. It is an existing thing; it is an absolute gift.
[Correspondingly, with the aid of the Holy Spirit] Manifestations of God surround the
essence and qualities of the creatures, transcend and contain existing realities and understand
all things, therefore, Their knowledge is divine knowledge, and not acquired – that is to say,
it is a holy bounty; it is a divine revelation.ix
Divine Manifestations are capable of spiritual visions and discoveries such as, for example, the
transfiguration of Jesus Christ that has been described in the Bible,x and they are the only source of
the knowledge of God, his will and his attributes for the rest of humanity.
Reason vs. Sensory Perception
Among the three main sources of knowledge – sensory perception, abstract reasoning and
intuition – the latter is always individuated i.e. peculiar to the person who experiences it. We do not
share our intuitions in common with other people and, therefore, cannot claim them to be generally
valid. Sense perception and rationality, on the other hand, both refer to the objective world of nature
and by virtue of that have universal character. While the senses provide us with perception of
individual objects, rational analysis produces abstractions and generalities. Hence, reasoning
appears, to be the strongest among various forms of human cognition because it is universal both in
its sources and outcomes.
A new philosophical movement known as Positivism that arose in Europe around the mid-
19th century challenged those traditional attitudes toward human rationality. A French philosopher,
sociologist, and the founder of Positivism August Comte (1787-1857) stressed the importance of
knowledge that is gained: through the five senses on the ground that observation and
experimentation, which constitute the foundation of science, are impossible without empirical data.
In his writings and talks ‘Abdu’l-Bahá criticized such an approach as inconsistent with empirical
evidence itself.xi He said in this respect, for example:
Modern philosophers say: ‘We have never seen the spirit in man, and in spite of our
researches into the secrets of the human body we do not perceive a spiritual power. How can
we imagine a power which is not sensible?’
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As he replies in answer to this questions:
If we wish to deny everything that is not sensible then we must deny the realities which
unquestionably exist. For example, ethereal matter [the forces of which are said in physics to
be heat, light, electricity and magnetism] is not sensible, though it has an undoubted
existence. The power of attraction is not sensible, though it certainly exists. From what do
we affirm these existences? From their signs [and effects].xii
It is well known that animals possess sensory perception that is often sharper and more
powerful than that of humans. They lack, however, the faculty of reason that makes the animals the
subject to nature and inferior to man. “God’s greatest gift to man is that of intellect, or
understanding,” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes,
All creation, preceding Man, is bound by the stern law of nature… Man alone has freedom,
and, by his understanding or intellect, has been able to gain control of and adapt some of
those natural laws to his own needs.xiii
The materialist position, on the contrary, assigned to human intellect the place within the natural
order as its product and an inalienable part of it. While capable of rational inquiry human reason, as
materialists contended, can never penetrate the essence of nature or understand all of creation, which
is the sign of its inferiority to the world of nature. Furthermore, as they argued, human intellect is a
physical endowment, very much like the endowment of sight, hearing and other senses, and, hence,
it ceases to exist along with the rest of sense organs at the moment of death of an individual. As
subject to decomposition, human intellect, therefore, also proves to be part of the natural order.
In responding to these arguments, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá distinguishes between physical and ideal
endowments, material and ideal perception and virtues. He writes, for example, that the “sense of
sight in man is a physical virtue; but insight, the power of inner perception, is ideal in its nature.”xiv
He seems to agree with the materialists that “the power of ideation, or faculty of intellection, is
material,” but considers the “acquisition of the realities of phenomena [as] an ideal virtue; likewise
the emotions of man and his ability to prove the existence of God.”xv
In various places ‘Abdu’l-Bahá juxtaposes contemporary to him European empiricist
philosophy with the tradition of classical rationalism. He writes:
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The criterion of judgment in the estimation of western philosophers is sense perception…
The philosophers of the East consider the perfect criterion to be reason or intellect…they
state that the senses are the assistants and instruments of reason, and that although the
investigation of realities may be conducted through the senses, the standard of knowing and
judgment is reason itself.
He continues:
The materialistic philosophers of the West declare that man belongs to the animal kingdom,
whereas the philosophers of the East – such as Plato, Aristotle and the Persian – divide the
world of existence or phenomena of life into two general categories or kingdoms: one the
animal kingdom, or world of nature, the other human kingdom, or world of reason.xvi
As a definite proof that humanity transcends the world of nature and does not fully constitute a part
of it ‘Abdu’l-Bahá presents the following argument. “[I]t is evident,” he points out, “that in the
world of nature conscious knowledge is absent. Nature is without knowing whereas man is
conscious.” “If it be claimed that the intellectual reality of man belongs to the world of nature,” he
continues, “– that it is a part of the whole – we ask is it possible for the part to contain virtues which
the whole does not possess?” In other words: “Is it possible that the extraordinary faculty of reason
in man is animal in character and quality?”xvii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s own answer to this question is
definitely negative.
Reason vs. Revelation
In parallel with various types of cognition there can be empiricist, rationalist, intuitivist,
traditionalist or scriptural philosophy. A British thinker John Locke, for instance, was a pioneer of
empiricist philosophy in modern Europe. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece and
Descartes and Leibniz in more recent Western history advocated rationalist philosophy. A German
thinker Schelling developed intuitivist philosophy that before him flourished in various schools of
religious mysticism.
Traditionalist and scriptural philosophy have roots in human culture as deep as ancient
rationalism of Plato and Aristotle. Already in the 6th century BC a Chinese sage Confucius taught a
social and moral philosophy that was based on the “tradition of the past” and such Chinese classics
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as the Book of Odes, the Book of Ritual, and others. Around the same time Indians invented
scriptural philosophy in order to defend the truth of Hinduism by means of rational arguments.
Scholars estimate that a Hindu thinker Jaimini wrote Mimansa-Sutra – the earliest treatise within the
tradition of Hindu religious philosophy that belongs to the school of Purva-Mimansa – in the 4th
century BC.
Philo of Alexandria is usually considered the first ‘scriptural philosopher’ in the Western
intellectual tradition. Born around 20 B.C. and raised as an Orthodox Jew, Philo was heavily
influenced by the ancient rationalism. In his own philosophical system Philo created a synthesis of
Jewish wisdom and Greek thought. More specifically, he supported the revelation of Moses in the
Torah by the philosophical speculation of Plato and the Stoics. Later Christian philosophers and
theologians would engage in a similar enterprise but already with respect to their own Christian
scriptural writings.
In the Middle Ages when philosophy became the ‘servant of theology’ such method of
philosophizing produced great works coming from diverse religious traditions – Shankara and
Ramanuja in Hinduism, Avicenna in Islam, Hemacandra in Jainism, Moses Maimonides in Judaism,
Chu-His in neo-Confucianism, and St. Thomas Aquinas in Christianity. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá belongs to the
same tradition of scriptural philosophy as well. Even more so, in Bahá’í Faith he is regarded as both
the infallible interpreter and creator of scriptures. And – as always is the case with this type of
philosophizing – it is the interplay between reason and revelation that constitutes the nerve of
‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s thought.
Revelation brings about the knowledge of God, and it is “the bounty of the Holy Spirit,” as
‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes, that “gives the true method of comprehension which is infallible and
indubitable… this is the condition in which certainty can alone be attained.”xviii The knowledge of
God is delivered by God’s messenger or, in Bahá’í terms, a Divine Manifestation who “is like a
mirror wherein the Sun of Reality is reflected.”xix “All the prophets and Messengers have come from
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One Holy Spirit,” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá explains in another place, “and bear the Message of God fitted to
the age in which they appear.”xx And later: “All the Manifestations of God bring the same Light;
they only differ in degree, not in reality… The teaching is ever the same, it is only the outward
forms that change.”xxi Finally, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá points out, revelation always calls for rational
explanation and interpretation since
Divine things are too deep to be expressed by common words. The heavenly teachings are
expressed in parable in order to be understood and preserved for ages to come. When the
spiritually minded dive deeply into the ocean of their meaning they bring to the surface the
pearls of their inner significance. There is no greater pleasure than to study God’s Word with
a spiritual mind.xxii
Now, if revelation is necessarily the subject to interpretation, reasoning as the most potent
agent of human cognition must support it. Devoid of faith human rationality becomes autonomous,
self-sufficient and may lose its higher purpose “for with learning cometh arrogance and pride, and it
bringeth on error and indifference to God.”xxiii Without rational investigation, on the other hand,
faith may turn into mere superstition. Hence – the dialectic of philosophy and theology, science and
religion that plays such an important role in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s thought.
The need for the harmony between science and religion is one of the central principles of
Bahá’í Faith that was enunciated by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in his numerous speeches throughout Europe and
America. In Paris Talks ‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes, for instance, that “any religion contrary to science is
not the truth.”xxiv He explains further:
All religious laws conform to reason, and are suited to the people for whom they are framed,
and for the age in which they are to be obeyed… I say unto you: weigh carefully in the
balance of reason and science everything that is presented to you as religion. If it passes this
test, then accept it, for it is truth! If, however, it does not so conform, then reject it, for it is
ignorance!xxv
In another place ‘Abdu’l-Bahá consoles his listeners with regard to possible – past and future –
conflicts between faith and reason: “Our Father will not hold us responsible for the rejection of
dogmas which we are unable either to believe or comprehend, for He is ever infinitely just to His
children.”xxvi
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Limitations of Knowledge
The limitations of knowledge are an important subject matter in modern Western
epistemology, especially after the works of Immanuel Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason the
founder of German Idealism has demonstrated the inherent limitations of human reasoning and
questioned the possibility of metaphysics – the knowledge of the essences of things – as an exact
science. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá does not mention Kant or Kant’s theories but he touches upon Kantian
themes in his writings.
According to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, human cognition is significantly limited in several ways. First –
and here he echoes the Kenigsberg thinker – one cannot penetrate the essences of things apart from
their qualities. As ‘Abdu’l-Bahá puts it:
Know that there are two kinds of knowledge: the knowledge of the essence of a thing and the
knowledge of its qualities. The essence of a thing is known through its qualities; otherwise it
is unknown and hidden… everything is known by its qualities and not by its essence.xxvii
As he continues:
The inner essence of man is unknown and not evident but by its qualities it is characterized
and known. [Also] the Divine Reality is unknown with regard to its essence and is known
with regard to its attributes.xxviii
Likewise, the essence of the world of nature is also unknown and for the same reason since
“[p]henomenal or created things are known to us only by their attributes.”xxix
The second limitation of knowledge refers to humanity’s place in creation and the
corresponding inability to know higher levels of existence. As ‘Abdu’l-Bahá points out, the
“difference in degree is ever an obstacle to comprehension of the higher by the lower, the
inferior.”xxx As he explains in another place:
A lower degree cannot comprehend a higher although all are in the same world of creation –
whether mineral, vegetable or animal… In the human plane of existence we can say we have
knowledge of a vegetable, its qualities and product; but the vegetable has no knowledge or
comprehension whatever of us.xxxi
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Hence, humans cannot comprehend Divinity, the essence of nature or of themselves since these are
realities higher than that of our own. Neither can we comprehend the spiritual realm or life after
death – similarly to animals that have no understanding of the reality of human existence.
The third limitation of knowledge, according to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, refers to the general liability
of human cognition. As he points out, the “four criteria [of human knowledge] according to the
declarations of men are: first, sense perception; second, reason; third, traditions; fourth,
inspirations.”xxxii All of them are liable to error. The sense perception, for instance, “is imperfect
[because] it is subject to many aberrations and inaccuracies.”xxxiii As for human reasoning, ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá argues,
in the estimation of the people of insight this criterion is likewise defective and unreliable,
for [those] philosophers who held to reason or intellect as the standard of human judgment
have differed widely among themselves upon every subject of investigation… As they differ
and are contradictory in conclusions, it is evidence that the method and standard of test must
have been faulty and insufficient.xxxiv
Religious traditions can also be incomplete and inconclusive because their interpretations are
formed by human reasoning as well and, as a result, produce contradictory explanations. Finally,
intuitions or inspiration, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá notes, “are the promptings or susceptibilities of the human
heart [and can be] sometimes satanic.” “How are we to differentiate them?” – he asks – “How are
we to tell whether a given statement is an inspiration and promptings of the heart through the
merciful assistance or through the satanic agency?”xxxv
The conclusion ‘Abdu’l-Bahá arrives at is to combine all four standards of judgment in order
to come to a more conclusive proof. He writes that
a statement presented to the mind accompanied by proofs which the senses can perceive to
be correct, which the faculty of reason can accept, which is in accord with traditional
authority and sanctioned by the promptings of the heart, can be adjudged and relied upon as
perfectly correct, for it has been proved and tested by all the standards of judgment and
found to be complete.xxxvi
One should note, however, that by using all four criteria of judgment we increase the probability of
but do not necessarily arrive at the right conclusion. If each one of the criteria is liable to error, then
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all four of them – at least in theory – can also lead us astray. That is why numerous scriptural
philosophers who belonged to various religious traditions didn’t come to agreement with each other
and defended contradictory and even opposite doctrines and theories.
Conclusions
In conclusion of my overview of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s epistemology I would like to propose
another distinction that is not explicitly made in his writings. In addition to being objective and
subjective, human and divine, knowledge can also be direct or indirect. Direct knowledge is
acquired by the knower oneself while indirect knowledge is that which is mediated by another
person.
The ultimate object and purpose of any knowledge is truth. As ‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes, the
“Truth [itself] never changes but man’s vision changes.”xxxvii The Holy Spirit delivers the certainty
of truth in the form of revelation – but always through the intermediary of a chosen prophet. Hence,
the error-free but indirect knowledge has to be supported and verified by our direct but often
mistaken cognition – first of all by the “light of the intellect… the highest light that exists, for it is
born of the Light Divine.”xxxviii Since our own capacities for knowledge are limited by God, nature,
our education, life experiences and social environment, we lack the sense of certainty that is one of
the attributes of prophecy.. As ‘Abdu’l-Bahá notes,
The only true Explainer of the Book of God is the Holy Spirit, for no two minds are alike, no
two can comprehend alike, no two can speak alike. That is to say, from the mere human
standpoint of interpretation there could be neither truth nor agreement.xxxix
Such an epistemological position has far-reaching practical implications. It explains the co-existence
at any given historical moment of various conflicting religions and philosophies. It also lays the
foundation for intellectual tolerance and inter-religious dialogue that would serve as a necessary
prerequisite for achieving the global peace and security.
Mikhail Sergeev,
University of the Arts.
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i A version of this paper was presented at the Association for Bahá’í Studies 33rd Annual Conference in Washington,
DC, in August 2009.
ii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, in Writings and Utterances of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, New Delhi, India: Bahá’í
Publishing Trust, 2000, p. 210. Later on pages 246-47 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá reinforces the same point: “… the power and the
comprehension of the human spirit are of two kinds – that is to say, they perceive and act in two different modes. One
way is through instruments and organs: thus with this eye it sees; with this ear it hears; with this tongue it talks… The
other manifestation of the powers and actions of the spirit is without instruments and organs.”
iii Ibid, p. 211.
iv ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks, ibid, p. 789.
v Ibid, p. 789.
vi ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, ibid, p. 247.
vii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks, ibid, pp. 791-92.
viii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, ibid, p. 242.
ix Ibid, p. 211.
x ‘Abdu’l-Bahá discusses in this context the event of transfiguration in Some Answered Questions, ibid, p. 260. As “a
spiritual vision and a scene of the Kingdom,” it is also mentioned in Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, ibid,
p. 383.
xi Speaking about Positivists whom he simply calls materialists ‘Abdu’l-Bahá displays an unusual and rare for him sense
of sarcasm: “One of the strongest things witnessed is that the materialists of today are proud of their natural instincts and
bondage. They state that nothing is entitled to belief and acceptance except that which is sensible or tangible. By their
own statements they are captives of nature, unconscious of the spiritual world, uninformed of the divine Kingdom and
unaware of heavenly bestowals. If this be a virtue, the animal has attained it to a superlative degree for the animal is
absolutely ignorant of the realm of spirit and out of touch with the inner world of conscious realization. The animal
would agree with the materialist in denying the existence of that which transcends the senses.” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The
Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, p. 958. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, pp. 1085.
xii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, ibid, p. 174, 228. In this article we confine our analysis to epistemological
and not ontological ussies. So, the difference between sensible and intellectual reality is discussed here as an
epistemological concern with no distinction made with respect to the objects of intellectual knowledge that may be
either material (etherial matter) and spiritual (love). From the ontological perspective those non-sensible realities should
be differentiated but they are often not when ‘Abdu’l-Bahá speaks with reference to the theory of knowledge: “…the
power of intellect is not sensible; none of the inner qualities of man is a sensible thing; on the contrary they are
intellectual realities. So, love is a mental reality and not sensible… In the same was, nature, also in its essence is an
intellectual reality and is not sensible; the human spirit is an intellectual, not sensible reality.” (p. 174)
xiii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks, ibid, pp. 715-16.
xiv ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, pp. 1085. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá uses the term ‘ideal’ here as interchangeable
with ‘spiritual’: “the body of man expresses certain material virtues, but spirit of man manifests virtues that
are ideal.” He considers memory to be an ideal entity: “The sense of hearing is a physical endowment, whereas memory
in man is ideal.” (p. 1085)
xv Ibid, p. 1085.
xvi Ibid, pp. 1110-11.
xvii Ibid, p. 1114.
xviii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, ibid, p. 283.
xix ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, p. 954.
xx ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in London, ibid, p. 1226.
xxi Ibid, p. 1244.
xxii Ibid, p. 1250
xxiii Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, ibid, p. 356.
xxiv ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks, ibid, pp. 764.
xxv Ibid, pp. 770, 772.
xxvi Ibid, p. 707.
xxvii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, ibid, p. 243.
xxviii Ibid, p. 243.
xxix ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, p. 1166. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá refers here to the so-called
objective knowledge that is gained through the organs. In the case of subjective or spiritual knowledge he seems to
accept the possibility of cognition of things-in-themselves. See Section 2 of this article.
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xxx Ibid, p. 955.
xxxi Ibid, p. 904.
xxxii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, p. 823. In Some Answered Questions ‘Abdu’l-Bahá omits
intuition or inspiration and juxtaposes senses, reason and tradition to the revelation of the Holy Spirit in order to
emphasize the uncertain character of human cognition as compared to Divine omniscience. Ibid, pp. 282-83.
xxxiii Ibid, p. 1024. In this quotation ‘Abdu’l-Bahá refers to the sense of sight but his analysis is equally applicable to all
other senses.
xxxiv Ibid, p. 1024. It should be noted that disagreement itself does not mean that the methods by which people come to
the disagreement, are unreliable. We may have disagreed for centuries over the questions of philosophy not because our
reason is deficient by nature, but because human intellectual capacities developed slowly over the millennia.
xxxv Ibid, p. 1025.
xxxvi Ibid, p. 1025.
xxxvii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in London, ibid, p. 1239.
xxxviii ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks, ibid, pp. 731.
xxxix ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, ibid, pp. 988-89.